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Abstract
Intelligent agents in open environments inevitably face the Qualification Problem: The executabil-
ity of an action can never be predicted with absolute certainty; unexpected circumstances, albeit
unlikely, may at any time prevent the successful performance of an action. Reasoning agents in
real-world environments rely on a solution to the Qualification Problem in order to make useful pre-
dictions but also to explain and recover from unexpected action failures. Yet the main theoretical
result known today in this context is a negative one: While a solution to the Qualification Problem
requires to assume away by default abnormal qualifications of actions, straightforward minimiza-
tion of abnormality falls prey to the production of anomalous models. We present an approach to
the Qualification Problem which resolves this anomaly. Anomalous models are shown to arise from
ignoring causality, and they are avoided by appealing to just this concept. Our theory builds on the
established predicate logic formalism of the Fluent Calculus as a solution to the Frame Problem and
to the Ramification Problem in reasoning about actions. The monotonic Fluent Calculus is enhanced
by a default theory in order to obtain the nonmonotonic approach called for by the Qualification
Problem. The approach has been implemented in an action programming language based on the Flu-
ent Calculus and successfully applied to the high-level control of robots.  2001 Elsevier Science
B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
To program software agents and robots equipped with high-level cognitive capabilities
is the enterprise of Cognitive Robotics [17,43]. Rooted in the ability to reason—on the
basis of a mental world model—about goals and means to achieve them, these cognitive
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capabilities free agents from pre-defined problem solutions and so are expected to lead
to truly autonomous intelligent, artificial agents. An early scientific experiment in this
direction was the robot Shakey [29], capable of shuffling around regular-shaped toy blocks
so as to achieve certain goals like building a particular stack of blocks. This case study
showed success insofar as it proved it feasible to build robots which plan ahead and use
their plans to actually pursue their goals. On the other hand, Shakey acted in an artificially
constrained, closed environment, in which no disturbances from unexpected sources had
to be taken into account.
Some years later, a crucial problem with scaling Shakey’s success up to open, real-
world environments was named the Qualification Problem [26]. It arises from the fact
that in natural environments the successful execution of actions can never be predicted
with absolute certainty. Unexpected circumstances, albeit unlikely, may at any time
prevent an autonomous agent from performing the intended actions. Planning and acting
under this proviso requires the agent to rigorously assume away, by default, all of the
numerous possible but unlikely abnormal qualifications of his actions, lest the agent is
unable to devise plans which are perfectly reasonable although they cannot guarantee
success.
Every daily-life action serves as witness to us humans constantly ignoring a raft of
possible obstacles to the successful performance of an action. The classical example in
the AI literature is planning to start the engine of a car without making sure that there is no
potato in the tail pipe, despite the fact that a clogged tail pipe necessarily renders this action
impossible. 1 This ignorance prima facie is rational since it is simply impossible to verify
all preconditions of actions in real-world environments: Aside from the fact that besides
a clogged tail pipe there could be lots of other obstacles for starting the car, how can we
ensure that after checking the tail pipe it does not become clogged during us walking to
the front door and taking a seat prior to turning the ignition key? Hence, while improbable
preconditions must not be completely disregarded in an adequate representation of the
world, a proposition like “there is no potato in the tail pipe” should not be treated as a
‘regular’ precondition in the formal specification of the action of starting the engine. For
otherwise the reasoning agent is always forced to verify this condition before assuming
that the action can be successfully executed. This is the Qualification Problem. Intelligent
agents rely on a solution to this problem in order to make useful predications but also to
explain and recover from unexpected action failures. 2
Assuming away unlikely but not impossible qualifications means that if in a certain
situation there are hints to the presence of such unexpected qualifications, or if to the
surprise of the agent an action actually fails, then the default conclusion should no
longer be adhered to. In this respect the entire process is intrinsically nonmonotonic.
Consequently, McCarthy proposed circumscription [27] as a means to minimize abnormal
qualifications [28]. However, a severe defect with this approach was discovered soon
1 According to Ginsberg and Smith [13], this example is also due to McCarthy.
2 Some authors, e.g., Grinsberg and Smith [13], Lin and Reiter [22], Shanahan [44], have narrowed the
Qualification Problem to the problem of determining implicit preconditions of actions which derive from state
constraints. Yet these are treated as regular preconditions in the above sense, that is, they must provably hold
in correct plans. Hence, they are not meant by McCarthy’s original conception of the problem, which concerns
preconditions that can be assumed true by default.
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after [19]. In a nutshell, this so-called problem of anomalous models arises if the successful
performance of some action, say DisableEmission, brings about a situation which is
exceptional in that another action, say StartEngine, is blocked. Suppose an agent considers
performing DisableEmission followed by StartEngine in a situation where he has no
reason to assume unusual circumstances. Then the agent can reasonably expect that
DisableEmission will be successful, thus blocking StartEngine. Yet this does not follow
with simple minimization of abnormal qualifications in a straightforward axiomatization of
this scenario along the line of [28]. For there exists a minimal but anomalous model where
DisableEmission is qualified in the first place. This without any actual reason at all except
for the exclusively formal argument that assuming an abnormality wrt. DisableEmission
avoids assuming an abnormality wrt. StartEngine. Anomalous models like this leave the
logic totally impotent as regards the tasks of prediction and planning.
We recall in more detail the problem with the original approach to the Qualification
Problem in the following Section 2, in which we also pin down the reason for the failure. In
a nutshell again, it is the lack of a suitable notion of causality: The action DisableEmission
causes a qualification of action StartEngine while no such cause can be given for the
suggested qualification of DisableEmission. Guided by this insight, we develop a method
for coping with the Qualification Problem which overcomes the problem of anomalous
models by respecting causality when minimizing abnormality. Our theory builds on the
axiomatization technique of the Fluent Calculus, which provides, in classical predicate
logic, a solution to the basic Frame Problem [24] by means of state update axioms [51], and
to the Ramification Problem [12] by means of causal propagation of indirect effects [49,
50]. 3 The Fluent Calculus is recalled in Section 3. This monotonic solution to two
fundamental problems in reasoning about actions is enhanced in Section 4 to account for
the Qualification Problem. Minimization of abnormalities is carried out by means of default
logic [37] but with an important difference to the problematic standard minimization
as sketched above: We assume away unjustified causes for abnormalities rather than
abnormalities themselves. The crucial advantage of this approach is that the standard
reasoning techniques for actions and effects apply whenever the only abnormalities that
occur are justified. Our theory is shown to thus solve the problem of anomalous models. In
Section 5 this basic account of the Qualification Problem is extended by the possibility
to specify priorities among abnormal qualifications, by which is aided the search for
reasonable explanations in case of unexpected action failure. In Section 6 we introduce
into our theory the distinction between strong and weak qualification, where the latter
means that performing an action is possible but fails to produce the usual effect [11].
In Section 7 we further extend our theory so as to also cover accidents, which are non-
recurring action failures. Our results are summarized, discussed, and compared to related
work in Section 8.
3 It should be stressed that we refer exclusively to the narrow technical Frame and Ramification Problem, as
opposed to the general problem of justifying assumptions of persistence [35].
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2. The anomalous model problem
2.1. A straightforward approach to the Qualification Problem
We will illustrate and analyze the occurrence of anomalous models in the context of
the Qualification Problem with a formalization of a popular dynamic AI environment, the
world of blocks. A number of toy blocks of equal size and shape are arranged on a table
and can be stacked onto each other by a robot equipped with a gripper. Our model of this
domain will, however, differ in a crucial aspect from standard models. We will not rely on
the usual assumption that the action of moving a block is always guaranteed with absolute
certainty to be both executable and successful provided that the block to be moved and the
destination are unobstructed.
Consider, for example, a Situation Calculus [25] axiomatization which uses the two
situation-dependent properties, or fluents as they are called, On(x, y, s) and Clear(x, s),
meaning, respectively, that block x is on y in situation s (where y is either another block or
the constant Table) and that block x is clear in situation s, that is, it is not obstructed by an-
other block. Let Move(r, u, v,w) denote the action of robot r moving block u away from v
onto w, and consider the generic predicate Poss(a, s) which shall be true if action a is pos-
sible in situation s. Then a typical axiom of the idealized blocks world is the following: 4
Poss
(
Move(r, u, v,w), s
)≡
u =w ∧ v =w ∧Clear(u, s)∧On(u, v, s)∧Clear(w, s) (1)
Yet this axiom is clearly not true in a real-world realization of the blocks world, with real
blocks on a real table and a real robot shuffling the blocks around. For it may of course hap-
pen that in a certain situation, say S17, one robot Robbie tries to move a particular block B9
from the table onto another block B34 but fails to accomplish this task although both blocks
are free at the time the action is invoked. There are numerous possible reasons for such an
unexpected failure: Block B9 may somehow be stuck to the table, the robot’s gripper may
be stuck, or the robot itself may just have run short of energy, and so on and so forth. 5
Whatever caused the non-executability of Move(Robbie,B9,Table,B34) in situation S17,
the factual observation,
Clear(B9, S17)∧On(B9,Table, S17)∧Clear(B34, S17)∧
B9 = B34 ∧ Table = B34 ∧¬Poss
(
Move(Robbie,B9,Table,B34), S17
) (2)
is plainly inconsistent in the light of axiom (1).
4 A word on the notation: Predicate and function symbols, including constants, start with a capital letter
whereas variables are in lower case, sometimes with sub- or superscripts. Free variables in formulas are assumed
universally quantified.
5 All of these circumstances render the action of moving the block physically impossible. Following [11] we
call them strong qualifications of the action. A weak qualification, on the other hand, occurs when an action
can be performed but its execution produces effects other than the expected ones. The gripper may, for instance,
accidentally drop the block, or the tower on top of which the block shall be placed may be too instable to carry
the additional weight, etc. Formally, a weak qualification of action a in situation s means that Poss(a, s) is true
but the usual effects do not materialize. In what follows, we confine ourselves to strong qualifications; the notion
of weakly qualified actions is reconsidered in Section 6.
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In order to obtain a realistic representation, the idealized definition of Poss(Move(r, u, v,
w), s) needs to be modified. A crucial obstacle towards this end is that it is usually
impossible to provide in advance an exhaustive enumeration of all conceivable reasons
for a particular instance of the action to turn out non-executable [26]. The only way
out is to introduce one or more general propositions by which are captured all possible
qualifications but which themselves are not assumed exhaustively described. Two such
propositions are appropriate for describing the abnormal (strong) qualifications of a robot
trying to move a block: The block may not be movable or the robot’s gripper does not work
(possibly due to a malfunction of the robot itself). Formally, we introduce the binary atoms
Ab(Movable(x), s) and Ab(Functioning(Gripper-of (r)), s) representing, respectively, that
block x cannot be moved in situation s for some abnormal reason and that the gripper of
robot r does not function in situation s in the way it normally does. Then the first step
towards coping with the Qualification Problem in the blocks world is to rewrite axiom (1)
to,
Poss
(
Move(r, u, v,w), s
)≡
u =w ∧ v =w ∧Clear(u, s)∧On(u, v, s)∧Clear(w, s)∧
¬Ab(Movable(u), s)∧¬Ab(Functioning(Gripper-of (r)), s) (3)
The added preconditions summarize all abnormal qualifications, that is, obstacles which
are a priori unlikely to happen and therefore need to be assumed away by default in order
to jump to the conclusion that the action is possible under normal circumstances. Hence, the
extension of Ab should be minimized, e.g., by circumscription [27]. Suppose, for example,
this is all that is known of the initial situation S0:
Clear(A,S0)∧On(A,Table, S0)∧ Clear(B,S0) (4)
Then CIRC[(3)∧ (4);Ab] 6 entails Poss(Move(Robbie,A,Table,B), S0), tacitly assuming
that A = B and Table = B . Under normal circumstances the new formulation thus
behaves just like the idealized precondition axiom (1), allowing to predict that actions are
normally successful. On the other hand, the realistic account is flexible enough to handle
abnormal circumstances. For instance, it is consistent with (3) to make the observation
above, (2), stating that unexpectedly our robot was unable to move B9 onto B34 in
situation S17. Moreover, if additional knowledge hints at the presence of an abnormal
qualification, then the default conclusion no longer applies. Consider, for example, the
fluent GluedToTable(x, s) meaning that block x is glued to the table in situation s. This
new fluent relates to the existing ones in our axiomatization thus:
GluedToTable(x, s)⊃On(x,Table, s)
(5)
GluedToTable(x, s)⊃ Ab(Movable(x), s)
Then CIRC[(3) ∧ (4) ∧ (5);Ab] still entails Poss(Move(Robbie,A,Table,B), S0); but if
the observation GluedToTable(A,S0) is added, then it can no longer be concluded that A,
now known to be fixed, can be moved.
6 By CIRC[Ψ ;Ab] we denote the formula which is obtained by circumscribing, in Ψ , predicate Ab with all
other predicates allowed to vary [21].
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2.2. The defect of the straightforward approach
So far the basic approach to the Qualification Problem, which McCarthy already
anticipated in his seminal paper [26] and formalized some 10 years later using his
nonmonotonic formalism of circumscription [28]. However, the Qualification Problem
turned out to resist this straightforward attack [19]. A serious problem turns up as soon as
an action is considered which causes abnormal circumstances as regards the executability
of another action. Simple minimization of abnormalities then sanctions anomalous models.
Take, for example, the action denoted by GlueToTable(r, x) of agent r gluing a block x to
the table. Realistically, this action is possible whenever robot r possesses glue, x is clear
and on the table, and no abnormal qualification occurs:
Poss
(
GlueToTable(r, x), s
)≡
Has(r,Glue, s)∧Clear(x, s)∧On(x,Table, s)∧
¬Ab(Movable(x), s)∧¬Ab(Functioning(Gripper-of (r)), s)∧
¬Ab(Usable(Glue), s) (6)
where fluent Has(r, x, s), constant Glue, and abnormality atom Ab(Usable(x), s) bear the
obvious meaning. Let the effect of the action be given by this implication: 7
Poss
(
GlueToTable(r, x), s
)⊃
GluedToTable
(
x,Do(GlueToTable(r, x), s)
) (7)
where the generic function Do(a, s) denotes the situation reached by performing action a
in situation s. To see how this domain axiomatization reveals the defect with the
straightforward approach to the Qualification Problem, consider the following description
of the initial situation:
On(A,Table, S0)∧Clear(A,S0)∧ Clear(B,S0)∧Has(Robbie,Glue, S0) (8)
This specification does not give any reason for expecting abnormal circumstances in S0.
Therefore it is reasonable to assume that both of the two actions Move(Robbie,A,Table,B)
and GlueToTable(Robbie,A) are possible initially since all of the respective ‘regular’ pre-
conditions are known to be satisfied. Hence, we must expect that when our robot actually
uses the glue, then the action’s effect, (7), materializes, that is, GluedToTable(A,S1), where
S1 =Do(GlueToTable(Robbie,A),S0). In turn, this conclusion leads to the prediction that
Ab(Movable(A),S1) according to (5), hence ¬Poss(Move(Robbie,A,Table,B), S1) ac-
cording to axiom (3). To summarize, in the light of the given information about the initial
situation, reasonable predictions are:
(1) The robot should succeed if he tried to move block A onto block B in S0.
(2) The robot should also succeed if he tried to glue block A to the table in S0.
(3) The robot should, however, not succeed with moving block A onto block B after
having glued A to the table in S0.
7 We do not presuppose a particular solution to the Frame Problem here since it is irrelevant at this point.
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Yet none of these desirable conclusions follows by simple minimization of abnormality, as
the following result shows.
Proposition 1. Let Σ consist of the axioms (3) and (5)–(8). There exists a minimal (with
respect to the set of true instances of Ab) modelM of Σ such that
M |= ¬Poss(Move(Robbie,A,Table,B), S0)∧
¬Poss(GlueToTable(Robbie,A),S0)∧
Poss
(
Move(Robbie,A,Table,B), S1
)
where S1 =Do(GlueToTable(Robbie,A),S0).
Proof. LetM be a model of Σ with Ab(Movable(A),S0) the sole true instance of an ab-
normality predicate. 8 ThenM |= ¬Poss(Move(Robbie,A,Table,B), S0) according to (3)
and M |= ¬Poss(GlueToTable(Robbie,A),S0) according to (6). The latter moreover im-
plies thatM can be chosen in such a way thatM |= Poss(Move(Robbie,A,Table,B), S1).
To show thatM is minimal in the above sense, it suffices to prove that Σ does not admit
a model in which Ab is false for all instances. So, suppose such a modelM′ existed, then
M′ |= (∀x)¬Ab(x, S0); hence,M′ |= Poss(GlueToTable(Robbie,A),S0) according to (6)
and (8). This implies M′ |= GluedToTable(A,S1) according to (7). From (5) it follows
that M′ |= Ab(Movable(A),S1), which contradicts the assumption that M′ falsifies all
instances of Ab. ✷
The ease with which such anomalous models like M arise prevents the Qualification
Problem from admitting a straightforward solution [19]. This is just as severe as
the infamous Yale Shooting counter-example was for attempts to solve the Frame
Problem [14]. 9 In the above scenario, for instance, there is actually not a single action
that is possible in all minimal models, which leaves our robot paralyzed. The Frame
Problem being the more fundamental of the two, past research has concentrated on finding
solutions which overcome the Yale Shooting problem (as documented, e.g., in [44]),
and the Qualification Problem stayed in the background. Nowadays, however, more than
one satisfactory solution to the Frame Problem exists, each providing a firm basis for
reconsidering the Qualification Problem and in particular the problem of anomalous
models. 10
8 Other anomalous models are obtained by taking either Ab(Functioning(Gripper-of (Robbie)), S0) or
Ab(Usable(Glue), S0), respectively, as the sole abnormality.
9 The parallels are indeed intriguing: Both problems invalidate the nonmonotonic approaches to the Frame
and Qualification Problem proposed in the very same paper [28]; both problems reveal the inadequacy of global
minimization in that anomalous models are produced; and, though this is not widely known, a variant of the Yale
Shooting problem was found independently by the discoverer of the problem of anomalous models in the context
of the Qualification Problem (V. Lifschitz, personal communication).
10 By “satisfactory solutions” to the Frame Problem we mean established predicate logic formalisms which
allow to succinctly specify actions without the need to devise a large number of non-effect axioms, and which do
not fall prey to the Yale Shooting problem.
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2.3. The defect’s cause: Ignoring causality
The intended model and the anomalous ones in our example differ in the abnormality
instances they consider true: Intended is Ab(Movable(A),S1), anomalous is each of
Ab(Movable(A),S0), Ab(Functioning(Gripper-of (Robbie)), S0), and Ab(Usable(Glue),
S0). The crucial question to be answered towards an extensive solution to the anomalous
model problem is this: Which general principle allows us to distinguish the first
abnormality from the others?
The reason for Ab(Movable(A),S1) being the expected conclusion reveals when
one tries to find explanations for the occurrence of each of the competing abnormal
circumstances—explanations which go beyond the exclusively formal argument that there
is no model without making true at least one instance of the abnormality predicate. Actually
it is only the intended abnormality which admits such an explanation: Successfully
gluing a block to the table is known to produce an effect which naturally brings about
the fact that this block can no longer be moved. No such cause can be given for the
three anomalous abnormalities. That is to say, while an abnormal qualification of the
initial action GlueToTable(Robbie,A) comes out of the blue in the anomalous models, an
abnormal qualification of the subsequent action Move(Robbie,A,Table,B), as is claimed
in the intended models, is easily explicable. One even tends to not consider the latter truly
abnormal since being unable to move a block after having glued it to the table is, after
all, what one would normally expect. Here lies the obvious parallel to the Yale Shooting
problem: A gun that becomes magically unloaded while waiting deserves being called
abnormal, whereas causality explains the death of the turkey if being shot at with a loaded
gun. 11
2.4. The solution: Respecting causality
The anomalous models sanctioned by straightforward circumscription illustrate the
necessity of a minimization strategy which respects causality. Abnormalities which do not
admit a causal explanation should be preferably assumed away. One way of achieving
this is to not let abnormal circumstances be subject to minimization if they are the
expected effect of some preceding action. This would solve the problem of anomalous
models because then caused abnormal qualifications cannot be compensated for by
granting other—truly unpredictable—abnormalities. In our blocks world scenario, for
instance, the abnormality in the intended model, Ab(Movable(A),S1), is an effect of the
action GlueToTable(Robbie,A) which has been performed in the preceding situation, S0.
More precisely, the abnormality is obtained as an indirect effect triggered by the
11 The Yale Shooting problem goes as follows (cf. [14]): Suppose we call abnormal any change of a proposition’s
truth value during the execution of an action (as suggested in [28]). Given that shooting at a turkey with a loaded
gun causes the animal to drop dead, we would expect exactly this to happen when we start with the gun loaded,
wait for a moment, and then shoot. Yet globally minimizing abnormalities in this example produces a second
model where the gun becomes unloaded during the first action, waiting, and the turkey survives. While this
magical change of the gun’s status is abnormal, the turkey surviving the shot is normal in the above sense (as
opposed to the change of its life status in the intended model)—hence, this second model minimizes abnormality
as well, though it is obviously wrong from the perspective of causality.
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direct effect GluedToTable(A,S1). This is a consequence of the second state constraint
in (5), which generally gives rise to the indirect effect that Ab(Movable(x), s) whenever
GluedToTable(x, s) has been caused. Extending the Frame Problem to indirect effects is
known as the Ramification Problem [12], and hence a solution to the problem of anomalous
models presupposes a solution to the latter.
The foregoing analysis sets out a strategy for overcoming the problem of anomalous
models in the context of the Qualification Problem: The fact that abnormal circumstances
could arise as the normal effect of certain actions is accounted for by treating instances
of Ab propositions as fluents which can be (indirectly) affected by actions. Abnormal
qualifications, once they materialize, persist, again just like ordinary fluents do. If, for
instance, the robot initially glues some block to the table, then shuffles around a number of
other blocks, and finally goes back to the first block and tries to move it, then it should not
come as a surprise if this action still fails. On the other hand, abnormal qualifications are
only present in exceptional cases and therefore need to be minimized. This assumption of
normality applies in particular to the initial situation, where the agent could not yet have
caused an abnormal qualification.
To summarize, an approach to the Qualification Problem which does not fall prey to the
generation of anomalous models needs to achieve the following:
(1) Abnormal qualifications of actions are assumed not to hold initially and not to arise
in later situations unless they are caused.
(2) The foregoing assumption regarding uncaused abnormalities is made prima facie
and therefore applies by default only.
A formal theory that satisfies these needs requires at the very least a solution to the basic
Frame Problem and to the Ramification Problem in order to obtain caused abnormalities as
indirect effects. Furthermore, a nonmonotonic theory is called for by the desire to assume
away certain properties by default. We propose a formal account of the Qualification
Problem which adds a nonmonotonic theory to the established predicate logic formalism
of the Fluent Calculus, to be introduced next. This calculus constitutes an ideal basis for
a realization of the above sketch since it provides a monotonic solution to both the Frame
and Ramification Problem. Starting out from a monotonic theory is of advantage when
integrating a solution to the Qualification Problem because there will be no interference
among nonmonotonic rules for inertia and those for qualifications.
3. The Fluent Calculus
3.1. Solving the inferential Frame Problem in pure first-order logic: An informal
introduction to the simple Fluent Calculus
The motivation for the development of the Fluent Calculus was to solve not only the
representational but also the inferential Frame Problem. While the former means finding
a succinct way of specifying all non-effects of actions, the latter means the problem
of effectively computing these non-effects [4,5]. The inferential Frame Problem arises
whenever the value of a fluent in one situation has to be derived from its value in another
situation. Apparently, one-by-one and using separate instances of the relevant non-change
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axioms, every such fluent value needs to be carried stepwise from one situation to the
other. This is done, for instance, in the Situation Calculus if successor state axioms are
used, no matter whether reasoning is performed forward in time or via regression [38], and
in the Event Calculus where persistence needs to be proven independently for each fluent
value [44]. The more fluents have to be carried unchanged through many intermediate
situations or event occurrences, the more valuable is a solution to the inferential Frame
Problem.
With roots in the logic programming formalism of [15], the Fluent Calculus addresses
the inferential Frame Problem by specifying the effects of actions in terms of how an action
modifies the state of the environment [51]. The notion of a state is therefore central to this
axiomatization technique. State terms can be abstract denotations, like the generic State(s)
denoting the state of a world in a situation s. On the other hand, each fluent represents
a concrete state, namely, the one in which just this fluent holds. Fluents are reified to
this end [36], that is, denoted by terms like On(A,Table), where On is a binary function
symbol.
State terms, in particular fluents, can be composed to new states with the special binary
function “◦”. Written in infix notation, this function maps two states into a state in which
the fluents of both arguments hold. For example, the term State(S0) ◦ GluedToTable(A)
denotes the state which is exactly like the one in the initial situation but where block A
is glued to the table. For technical reasons, the Fluent Calculus includes the pre-defined
constant ∅ denoting the empty state, in which—intuitively—no fluent is true.
A fundamental notion is that of a fluent to hold in a state. Fluent f holds in state z just
in case z can be decomposed into two states one of which is the singleton f . For notational
convenience, we introduce the macro Holds(f, z) as an abbreviation for the corresponding
equality formula:
Holds(f, z) def= (∃z′)z= f ◦ z′ (9)
This fundamental notion of truth and falsity of fluents in states requires a special theory of
state terms, by which “◦” is characterized as the union operation with ∅ as the empty set
of fluents (for the formal details see Section 3.3 below). Based on the standard function
State(s), a fluent is defined to hold in a situation just in case it holds in the corresponding
state:
Holds(f, s) def= Holds(f,State(s)) (10)
As an example, suppose that of the initial state in some scenario of our world of toy
blocks it is known that block A is on some block x , which in turn stands on the table; that
no block y is on top of block A or block B; and that our robot Robbie is in possession
of glue. In the Fluent Calculus, this incomplete state knowledge can be axiomatized as
follows:
(∃x)(Holds(On(A,x), S0)∧Holds(On(x,Table), S0))∧
(∀y)(¬Holds(On(y,A),S0)∧¬Holds(On(y,B),S0))∧
Holds
(
Has(Robbie,Glue), S0
) (11)
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With the help of macro definitions (9) and (10) and the foundational axioms, this
specification can be transformed into an equivalent formula which specifies what is known
about the ‘contents’ of State(S0):
(∃x, z)[State(S0)=On(A,x) ◦On(x,Table) ◦Has(Robbie,Glue) ◦ z∧
(∀y)(¬Holds(On(y,A), z)∧¬Holds(On(y,B), z))]. (12)
Put in words, State(S0) contains On(A,x) and On(x,Table) for some x , Has(Robbie,Glue),
and possibly more fluents z—with the restriction that z does not include a fluent On(y,A)
nor a fluent On(y,B), of which we know they are false in S0 for any y .
Based on the notion of states, the Frame Problem is solved by so-called state update
axioms, which specify how a state State(Do(A(x), s)) after performing an action A(x)
relates to the original state State(s) [51]. Following the classical STRIPS solution to the
inferential Frame Problem [10], positive effects are modeled by adding them to State(s).
This is straightforwardly specified as State(s) ◦ f1 ◦ · · · ◦ fn. Negative effects are modeled
by removing them from the current state. We denote removal of a fluent by z − f .
Generalizing STRIPS to incomplete state knowledge, this set operation requires a case
distinction if the truth value of f is unknown in z: In case ¬Holds(f, z), we have that
z−f is just z, else z−f = z′ implies z′ ◦ f = z and ¬Holds(f, z′). A suitable, rigorously
first-order axiomatization of removal is thus given by the following definition:
z′ = z− f def= ¬Holds(f, z′)∧ [z′ ◦ f = z∨ z′ = z] (13)
It is easy to see that this macro can be generalized to finitely many negative effects:
z′ = z−∅ def= z′ = z
z′ = z− (f1 ◦ · · · ◦ fn ◦ fn+1) (14)
def= (∃z′′)(z′′ = z− (f1 ◦ · · · ◦ fn)∧ z′ = z′′ − fn+1)
As an example, consider the action Move(r, u, v,w), whose direct effect is that block u
is on w and no longer on v: 12
Poss
(
Move(r, u, v,w), s
)⊃
State
(
Do(Move(r, u, v,w), s)
)= State(s) ◦On(u,w)−On(u, v) (15)
This state update axiom says that if Move(r, u, v,w) is possible and performed in s, then
the new state equals the old state except that On(u,w) becomes true and On(u, v) becomes
false. Take, for example, the action of moving block A away from its current location onto
blockB , and suppose, for the sake of argument, that (∃x)Poss(Move(Robbie,A,x,B),S0)
where State(S0) is specified by (12). Then the instance {r/Robbie, u/A,v/x,w/B, s/S0}
of state update axiom (15) yields
State
(
Do(Move(Robbie,A,x,B),S0)
)= State(S0) ◦On(A,B)−On(A,x)
12 For the moment we ignore how the action affects the fluent Clear used above. We wish to model this as an
indirect effect (see Section 3.4 below).
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Let S1 =Do(Move(Robbie,A,x,B),S0). Replacing State(S0) by an equal term according
to (12) yields
(∃x, z)State(S1) =
On(A,x) ◦On(x,Table) ◦Has(Robbie,Glue) ◦ z ◦On(A,B)−On(A,x)
Since On(A,x) holds in the state from which it is subtracted, macro definition (13) implies
¬Holds(On(A,x),State(S1))∧
(∃x, z)State(S1) ◦On(A,x) =
On(A,x) ◦On(x,Table) ◦Has(Robbie,Glue) ◦ z ◦On(A,B)
Since ¬Holds(On(A,x),State(S1)) and because state variable z in (12) can be chosen
such that ¬Holds(On(A,x), z), fluent On(A,x) can be canceled out on both sides of the
equation, which yields
(∃x, z)[State(S1)=On(x,Table) ◦Has(Robbie,Glue) ◦On(A,B) ◦ z∧
¬Holds(On(A,x), z)]
We have now obtained from an incomplete initial specification a still partial description of
the successor state, which in particular includes the unaffected fluent terms On(x,Table)
and Has(Robbie,Glue). These fluents have thus survived the computation of the effect
of the action and so need not be carried over by separate axioms. Moreover, knowledge
specified in (12) as to which fluents do not hold in z applies to the new state, which
includes z, just as well. Thus all unchanged fluent values have been concluded to
persist without applying extra inference steps. This is how the Fluent Calculus solves
the inferential Frame Problem. Its computational value is crucially dependent on an
efficient treatment of equality. While the simple addition of equality axioms may
constitute a considerable handicap for theorem proving, a variety of efficient constraint
solving algorithms have been developed for the special equational theory needed for the
function “◦” (see, e.g., [31]). An efficient implementation of the Fluent Calculus has
recently been developed using constraint logic programming [52].
Next we will introduce the Fluent Calculus formally.
3.2. Fluent Calculus signatures
Fluent Calculus signatures [51] can be considered reified versions of standard Situation
Calculus signatures Σ , which are many-sorted logic languages with equality and which
include the special sorts ACTION and SIT for actions and situations, respectively [18].
Some predicate symbols in Σ are fluent denotations; these are of arity  1 with the last
argument being of sort SIT. The corresponding Fluent Calculus signature is then obtained
by
(1) replacing each (n + 1)-place predicate symbol which denotes a fluent and whose
argument is of sort SORTS ×SIT by an n-place function symbol whose argument is
of sort SORTS;
(2) adding a sort FLUENT to which belong all well-sorted terms with leading function
symbol obtained in step 1, and a sort STATE of which FLUENT is a sub-sort;
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(3) adding the binary function symbol “◦” of type STATE × STATE → STATE and the
constant “∅” of sort STATE, which serves as a unit element of ◦;
(4) adding the unary function State of type SIT → STATE.
In the remainder of this paper, variables of sort ACTION will be denoted by the letter a,
variables of sort SIT by s, variables of sort FLUENT by f , and variables of sort STATE
by z, all possibly with sub- or superscripts.
3.3. Foundational axioms
Fundamental for any Fluent Calculus axiomatization is a set of equational axioms,
denoted Fstate, which is a suitable subset of the Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms characterizing
states as (possibly infinite) collections of fluents with “◦” acting as the union operation
and ∅ as the empty set of fluents:
(1) Axioms ACI1 (associativity, commutativity, idempotency, unit element),
(z1 ◦ z2) ◦ z3 = z1 ◦ (z2 ◦ z3)
z1 ◦ z2 = z2 ◦ z1 (16)
z ◦ z = z
z ◦ ∅ = z
(2) Irreducibility and decomposition,
¬Holds(f,∅)
Holds(f1, f )⊃ f = f1
Holds(f, z1 ◦ z2)⊃Holds(f, z1)∨Holds(f, z2)
(3) Equality of states,
(∀f )(Holds(f, z1)≡Holds(f, z2))⊃ z1 = z2
(4) Existence of states,
(∀Φ)(∃z)(∀f )(Holds(f, z)≡Φ(f ))
where Φ is a second-order predicate variable of sort FLUENT.
The very last axiom stipulates the existence of a state for all possible combinations of
fluents.
3.4. State update axioms
The schema Poss(A(x), s) ⊃ Γ [State(Do(A(x), s)),State(s)] is the universal form of
state update axioms. The form of the update component Γ depends on the ontological
assumptions that can be made of the action in question.
3.4.1. The simple case
Deterministic actions with only direct and closed effects give rise to the simplest form
of state update axioms, where the update is a mere equation relating State(Do(A(x), s))
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to State(s). By closed effects we mean that every action has a maximal, finite number
of positive and negative effects. An example of a simple state update axiom is (15) from
above.
Under the provision that actions do have only direct and closed effects, simple state
update axioms can be fully mechanically generated from a set of Situation Calculus-style
effect axioms if the latter can be assumed to give a complete account of the relevant effects
of an action. As the primary theorem of the Fluent Calculus it has been proved that a
collection of thus generated state update axioms solves the technical Frame Problem, that
is, it suitably reflects the basic assumption of persistence [51]. 13
Non-deterministic actions can be very elegantly specified by means of disjunctive state
update axioms Poss(A(x), s)⊃ Γ [State(Do(A(x), s)),State(s)] where Γ is a disjunction
of the possible effects, i.e., state updates, of the respective action [54]. An example will be
shown in Section 4.3.2.
3.4.2. State update axioms with ramifications
Only for small domains with very few fluents and actions is it possible and convenient to
specify state update axioms in the simple form where all effects are explicitly enumerated.
More complex domains require a solution to the Ramification Problem [13]. It denotes the
problem of handling indirect effects of actions that follow from so-called state constraints,
which describe dependencies among fluents. Consider, for example, the following state
constraint, which relates the fluent Clear(x) to other fluents in the blocks world:
Holds
(
Clear(x), s
)≡ x = Table∨¬(∃y)Holds(On(y, x), s) (17)
(This axiom implies, for instance, Holds(Clear(Table), z), Holds(Clear(A), z), and
Holds(Clear(B), z) for any z satisfying (12).) This state constraint gives rise to the
indirect effect that a block x becomes unclear or clear, respectively, as soon as some
other block is moved onto it or away from it. More precisely, if an action is performed
with effect On(y, x) for some y , then this action additionally causes Clear(x) to
become false whenever x = Table. Conversely, if an action is performed with effect
¬On(y, x), then Clear(x) becomes true as an indirect effect, provided that nothing else
is on x .
In the Fluent Calculus, indirect effects are accounted for by the successive application of
so-called causal relationships, which state under what conditions an effect triggers another
one [49,50]. A causal relationship is formally specified with the help of the expression
Causes(ε, , z, s) where ε (the triggering effect) and  (the ramification, i.e., indirect
effect) are possibly negated atomic fluent formulas and z is a state and s a situation. The
intuitive meaning is that the change to ε causes the change to  in state z and situation s. 14
The following two causal relationships, for example, formalize the potential indirect effects
on fluent Clear(x):
13 Actually, in [51] a variant of the Fluent Calculus is used where states are axiomatized as multisets of fluents
using a slightly different equational foundation [48]. The result can however be straightforwardly adapted to the
new axiomatization of Section 3.3, which has been introduced in [52].
14 The situation argument of Causes was not used in the original approach of [49]. We need it here because our
approach to the Qualification Problem relies on causal relationships which apply only in certain situations.
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Fig. 1. Ramification as causal chains: The result of the direct effect of action α, state z, is the source of a path
through several intermediate states, linked by a causal relation. An example would be to move a block in State(σ ),
in which case the block is on its new location in z. The further states are obtained by concluding, in any order,
that the old location is now clear and the new one is no longer so (except for the special case of the table). The
finally resulting state is always a fixpoint in the sense that no further causal relationship applies.
x = Table⊃ Causes(On(y, x),¬Clear(x), z, s) (18)
(∀y ′)¬Holds(On(y ′, x), z)⊃ Causes(¬On(y, x),Clear(x), z, s)
Put in words, if some y is put onto x which is not the table, then Clear(x) becomes false;
conversely, whenever some y is removed from x , then x becomes clear if nothing else is
on this block. 15
On the basis of causal relationships, the Ramification Problem is solved by causally
propagating indirect effects: Starting from the direct effects of an action, causal relation-
ships are applied successively. The overall result of performing the action is then a fixpoint
of such a chain of indirect effects. Fig. 1 gives a schematic illustration of this approach. 16
The formal axiomatization of causal propagation in the Fluent Calculus is as follows.
The above usage of Causes being syntactic sugar, the Fluent Calculus for ramifications
actually uses the predicate Causes with a more complex argument structure:
Causes : STATE6 × SIT
An instance Causes(z, e+, e−, z1, e+1 , e
−
1 , s) means that in situation s, if intermediate
state z is the result of positive effects e+ and negative effects e−, then an additional effect
is caused which leads to state z1 (now the result of positive and negative effects e+1 , e−1 ,
respectively, in which the new effect is additionally recorded). 17 For example,
Causes
(
z, On(A,B), On(A,x), z−Clear(B),
On(A,B), On(A,x) ◦Clear(B), s) (19)
says that if a state z is the result of positive effect On(A,B) and negative effect On(A,x),
then this causes Clear(B) to become false in z as an additional negative effect.
The macro Causes(ε, , z, s) is defined in terms of the 7-ary Causes by distinguishing
between positive and negative causes and effects:
15 In [49] we have proposed a method for the automatic generation of causal relationships from a set of state
constraints plus domain-dependent knowledge of ‘causal influence’.
16 For the sake of simplicity, here and in what follows we ignore the distinction between steady and stabilizing
indirect effects introduced and argued for in [50].
17 While formally collections of effects such as e+ and e− are terms of sort STATE, they should not be viewed
as corresponding to an actual complete state of the world. In what follows, all variables e with sub- or superscripts
are of sort STATE.
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Causes(f,f ′, z, s)
def= (∀e+, e−)Causes(z, e+ ◦ f, e−, z ◦ f ′, e+ ◦ f ◦ f ′, e− − f ′, s)
Causes(f,¬f ′, z, s)
def= (∀e+, e−)Causes(z, e+ ◦ f, e−, z− f ′, e+ ◦ f − f ′, e− ◦ f ′, s) (20)
Causes(¬f,f ′, z, s)
def= (∀e+, e−)Causes(z, e+, e− ◦ f, z ◦ f ′, e+ ◦ f ′, e− ◦ f − f ′, s)
Causes(¬f,¬f ′, z, s)
def= (∀e+, e−)Causes(z, e+, e− ◦ f, z− f ′, e+ − f ′, e− ◦ f ◦ f ′, s)
The reader may notice how the ‘momentum’, that is, the collections of positive and
negative effects, is guaranteed to remain consistent: If necessary, a newly established
positive (respectively negative) indirect effect is subtracted from the preceding negative
(respectively positive) effects. With this definition, (19) follows from the first causal
relationship in (18), given that B = Table.
Based on a specification of the causal relationships of a domain, the general form of
updates which account for indirect effects is as follows:
z= State(s) ◦ ϑ+ − ϑ− ⊃ Ramify(z,ϑ+, ϑ−,Do(A(x), s)) (21)
where
• ϑ+ are the direct positive effects of action A(x);
• ϑ− are the direct negative effects of action A(x);
• Ramify(z, e+, e−, s) means that State(s) is a fixpoint of iteratively applying causal
relationships to state z and effects e+, e− in situation s:
Ramify(z, e+, e−, s)
def= (∃z1, e+1 , e−1 )
(
State(s)= z1 ∧ (z, e+, e−, z1, e+1 , e−1 , s) ∈ µ[Causes]
)
where (x, y, s) ∈ µ[P ] abbreviates the following formula, which is a standard second-
order schema to axiomatize that (x, y, s) belongs to the reflexive and transitive closure
of predicate P with y being a fixpoint:
(∀Φ){(∀u)Φ(u, u, s)∧ (∀u, v, w)[Φ(u, v, s)∧ P(v, w, s)⊃Φ(u, w, s)] ⊃
Φ(x, y, s)}∧
(∀z)(P(y, z, s)⊃ y = z)
The use of its transitive closure presupposes the underlying Causes relation to be
completely specified. To this end, we circumscribe this predicate with respect to a given
axiomatization of cause-effect pairs. If Causes occurs only as the single consequent of
implications, like in (18), then second-order circumscription is equivalent to first-order
completion [21].
Consider, for example, the following state update axiom, which replaces the preliminary
one, (15), in the light of indirect effects:
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Poss
(
Move(r, u, v,w), s
)⊃
z= State(s) ◦On(u,w)−On(u, v)⊃
Ramify(z,On(u,w),On(u, v),Do(Move(r, u, v,w), s)) (22)
Suppose further that (∃x)Poss(Move(Robbie,A,x,B),S0) be given. State update ax-
iom (22) then implies
(∃x)(∀z)[z= State(S0) ◦On(A,B)−On(A,x)⊃
Ramify(z,On(A,B),On(A,x),Do(Move(Robbie,A,x,B),S0))]
Given B = Table, the circumscribed causal relationships, CIRC[(18);Causes], along with
the definition of Ramify entail
(∃x)(¬Holds(Clear(B),S1)∧Holds(Clear(x), S1))
where S1 =Do(Move(Robbie,A,x,B),S0).
A justification for this approach to the problem of indirect effects is given by [42], where
the general concept of causal propagation has been proposed as the formal foundation for
the Ramification Problem. Moreover, in a series of papers [32–34], a unifying semantics is
defined for a variety of approaches to the Ramification Problem, including our concept of
causal relationships.
4. Qualification in the Fluent Calculus: The basic approach
The Fluent Calculus and its solution to the Frame and Ramification Problems shall now
be extended so as to additionally address the Qualification Problem and in particular solve
the problem of anomalous models. Our formal approach follows the guidelines proposed
at the end of Section 2.4.
4.1. Abnormality fluents
The first step towards overcoming anomalous models is to introduce abnormality
predicates as fluents so that we can appeal to ramification in order to account for abnormal
qualifications which are caused by an action. To this end, the standard Fluent Calculus
signatures of Section 3.2 are extended by the binary function Ab(x, y) whose range is
the sort FLUENT. As before, the first argument, x , denotes properties like Movable(u)
or Functioning(Gripper-of (r)). The second argument, y , indicates the cause for the
abnormality; e.g., fluent Ab(Movable(A),Glued) shall denote the abnormality that block A
is not movable on account of it being glued to the table. Instances of the generic
‘abnormality’ fluent may occur in state constraints and, hence, in causal relationships,
which then define how abnormalities could arise as indirect effects. For our blocks world
formalization, for example, we introduce the following causal relationship because of the
second state constraint in (5): 18
18 For the Fluent Calculus these state constraints need of course be rewritten using the Holds expression; see
axioms (31) below.
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Causes
(
GluedToTable(x),Ab(Movable(x),Glued), z, s
) (23)
That is to say, whenever some block x gets glued to the table, then this causes a
qualification of any action which requires x to be movable. Conversely, if the block is
somehow freed, then the abnormality disappears together with its cause:
Causes
(¬GluedToTable(x),¬Ab(Movable(x),Glued), z, s) (24)
It may of course happen that Ab(Movable(x), y) also holds for some y other than Glued.
Such a fluent would not be affected if (24) were applied and hence x would continue to
be immovable. For convenience, we use the macros Ab(x, z) and Ab(x, s) to represent that
for some y , Ab(x, y) holds in state z respectively situation s:
Ab(x, z) def= (∃y)Holds(Ab(x, y), z)
(25)
Ab(x, s) def= Ab(x,State(s))
4.2. Arising of abnormal qualifications
The Qualification Problem arises because in the real world any abnormality may at any
time arise without being caused by the reasoning agent himself. This aspect is formally
captured by allowing instances of Ab to become true during any situation transition as a
side effect of the mere fact that the very transition takes place. So doing requires additional
causal relationships, which, as opposed to those just added (cf. (23)), describe exogenously
caused abnormalities. The signature is further extended to this end by the predicates
ExogCaused(f, s) and ExogUncaused(f, s). An instance ExogCaused(Ab(x,Exog), s)
indicates that in situation s an abnormality with respect to property x arises due to an
exogenous cause; conversely, an instance ExogUncaused(Ab(x,Exog), s) indicates that in
situation s an exogenously caused abnormality with respect to x disappears. 19 The effect
of exogenous causes is given by these foundational causal relationships:
ExogCaused
(
Ab(x,Exog), s
)⊃
Causes
(
z, e+, e−, z ◦ Ab(x,Exog), e+ ◦ Ab(x,Exog), e−, s)
(26)
ExogUncaused
(
Ab(x,Exog), s
)⊃
Causes
(
z, e+, e−, z− Ab(x,Exog), e+, e− ◦ Ab(x,Exog), s)
The reader may notice two distinctive properties of these indirect effects. First, they are
not conditioned on the preceding effects e+, e− because they describe changes that are
not triggered by other effects. Second, they are conditioned on the situation s since the
unusual arising or disappearance of an abnormal qualification in a particular situation does
not imply that the qualification arises or disappears in all other situations as well.
19 With the focus on the Qualification Problem, we only let the fluent Ab(x,Exog) be subject to exogenous
causes in this paper. In general, the new predicates ExogCaused(f, s) and ExogUncaused(f, s) can be used to
model any kind of exogenous influence on fluents.
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4.3. Minimizing exogenously caused abnormalities
Up to this point our additions to the Fluent Calculus did not affect the monotonicity of
the solution to the Frame and Ramification Problem. A nonmonotonic feature, however,
is required for completing the basic account of the Qualification Problem. Abnormal
qualifications are minimized whenever they are not caused by an action that has been
performed. This nonmonotonic behavior is achieved by adding appropriate default rules
in the sense of [37], by which the Fluent Calculus gets embedded into a default theory.
Formally, exogenous influence on abnormalities is minimized by default rules of the
following form:
δ+Exog(x, s) =
α : ¬ExogCaused(Ab(x,Exog), s)
¬ExogCaused(Ab(x,Exog), s) (27)
δ−Exog(x, s) =
α : ¬ExogUncaused(Ab(x,Exog), s)
¬ExogUncaused(Ab(x,Exog), s)
where the so-called prerequisites α can be arbitrary first-order formulas to further condition
the general assumption of normality. In all examples that follow, however, we tacitly
assume α to be a logical tautology, in which case it is simply omitted. As usual, a default
rule with variables represents the set of its (well-sorted) ground instances [37].
As has been argued in Section 2.4, an accompanying default assumption is needed for
abnormalities of any kind in the initial situation. Their minimization is carried out by
defaults of the following form:
δS0(x, y)=
α : ¬Holds(Ab(x, y), S0)
¬Holds(Ab(x, y), S0) (28)
If, for instance, the observations suggest no abnormalities, then the underlying default the-
ory has a unique extension, which includes (∀x)¬Ab(x, S0). (Recall that ¬Ab(x, s) means
¬Holds(Ab(x, y), s) for any y .) On the other hand, if, say, Holds(GluedToTable(B),S0)
is given, then the state constraint Holds(GluedToTable(x), s) ⊃ Holds(Ab(Movable(x),
Glued), s) implies Ab(Movable(B),S0) according to (25).
This completes our basic approach to the Qualification Problem by means of the Fluent
Calculus. To summarize, domains are axiomatized as default theories ∆= (D,Σ) where
D is a set of default rules of the form (27) or (28), and Σ is a set of Fluent Calculus
axioms including a circumscribed causal relation CIRC[Ψ ;Causes] where Ψ includes the
foundational relationships (26). The semantics is given by the usual definition of extensions
of ∆ and the notion of skeptical entailment following [37]. 20 In what follows we prove that
we have solved the anomalous model problem of Section 2. We also show why this solution
is not limited to deterministic actions.
20 A formula is skeptically entailed just in case it is contained in every extension of a default theory. The concept
of an extension in Default Logic underwent a number of improvements regarding arguably undesired features of
the original definition (such as non-cumulativity, non-commitment to assumptions, non-existence of extensions,
etc.; see, e.g., [8]). However, the default rules needed for the Qualification Problem are normal in the sense
of [37], and none of the aforementioned undesired properties holds for normal default theories.
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4.3.1. The anomalous model problem revisited
Let Dbw be the default rules (27) and (28), with prerequisite α = True, and let Σbw be
the Fluent Calculus theory consisting of the state update axioms,
Poss
(
Move(r, u, v,w), s
)⊃
z= State(s) ◦On(u,w)−On(u, v)⊃
Ramify(z,On(u,w),On(u, v),Do(Move(r, u, v,w), s))
(29)
Poss
(
GlueToTable(r, x), s
)⊃
z= State(s) ◦GluedToTable(x)⊃
Ramify(z,GluedToTable(x),∅,Do(GlueToTable(r, x), s))
the action precondition axioms,
Poss
(
Move(r, u, v,w), s
)≡
u =w ∧ v =w ∧Holds(Clear(u), s)∧Holds(On(u, v), s)∧
Holds
(
Clear(w), s
)∧¬Ab(Movable(u), s)∧
¬Ab(Functioning(Gripper-of (r)), s)
(30)
Poss
(
GlueToTable(r, x), s
)≡
Holds
(
Has(r,Glue), s
)∧Holds(Clear(x), s)∧
Holds
(
On(x,Table), s
)∧¬Ab(Movable(x), s)∧
¬Ab(Functioning(Gripper-of (r)), s)∧¬Ab(Usable(Glue), s)
the state constraints,
Holds
(
Clear(x), s
)≡ x = Table∨¬(∃y)Holds(On(y, x), s)
Holds
(
GluedToTable(x), s
)⊃Holds(On(x,Table), s)
Holds
(
GluedToTable(x), s
)≡Holds(Ab(Movable(x),Glued), s)
(31)¬Holds(On(x, x), s)
Holds
(
On(x, y), s
)∧Holds(On(x, y ′), s)⊃ y = y ′
Holds
(
On(y, x), s
)∧Holds(On(y ′, x), s)⊃ y = y ′ ∨ x = Table
the causal relationships CIRC[(18) ∧ (23) ∧ (24) ∧ (26);Causes], and the unique-name
axioms, 21
UNA[A,B,Table] ∧UNA[On,Clear,GluedToTable,Ab] ∧
UNA[Glued,Exog] ∧UNA[Movable,Functioning,Usable]
plus the foundational axioms Fstate. We then have the following result.
21 For convenience, we adopt from [2] the following notation for sets of equational axioms expressing
uniqueness of names: UNA[h1, . . . , hn] def=
∧
i<j hi (x) = hj (y)∧
∧
i [hi(x)= hi(y)⊃ x = y ].
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Proposition 2. Consider the initial specification,
Holds
(
On(A,Table), S0
)∧Holds(Clear(A),S0)∧Holds(Clear(B),S0)∧
Holds
(
Has(Robbie,Glue), S0
) (32)
Let ∆bw = (Dbw,Σbw ∪ {(32)}). Default theory ∆bw admits a unique extension, which
entails each of
(1) Poss(Move(Robbie,A,Table,B), S0),
(2) Poss(GlueToTable(Robbie,A),S0),
(3) ¬Poss(Move(Robbie,A,Table,B), S1),
where S1 =Do(GlueToTable(Robbie,A),S0).
Proof. Suppose there exists an interpretation M for the underlying Fluent Calculus
signature which is a model of Σbw, of (∀x, s)¬ExogCaused(Ab(x), s) and (∀x, s)
¬ExogUncaused(Ab(x), s), and of
State(S0) = On(A,Table) ◦Clear(A) ◦Clear(B) ◦Has(Robbie,Glue)
(33)
◦On(B,Table) ◦Clear(Table)
(Note that we have fixed an initial state in which A and B are the only blocks and both
are on the table, which is consistent with (32).) Then Σbw ∪ {(32)} ∪ {ω : :ωω ∈ Dbw} is
consistent. Hence, the unique extension E of ∆bw is
Th
[
Σbw ∪ {(32)} ∪
{
ω : : ω
ω
∈Dbw
}]
where Th[Ψ ] denotes the set of logical consequences of the set of formulasΨ . Precondition
axioms (30) in conjunction with (33), the unique-name axioms, and Fstate imply that
E |= Poss(Move(Robbie,A,Table,B), S0)∧
Poss
(
GlueToTable(Robbie,A),S0
)
Moreover, the second state update axiom in (29) in conjunction with causal relation-
ship (23) implies that E |= Holds(Ab(Movable(A),Glued), S1). From this and the first
one of the precondition axioms (30), it follows that
E |= ¬Poss(Move(Robbie,A,Table,B), S1)
It remains to be shown that an interpretation M exhibiting the abovementioned
properties does indeed exist. Starting from a model of the given unique-name assumptions,
the foundational axioms, and CIRC[(18)∧ (23)∧ (24)∧ (26);Causes], such a modelM
can be obtained by inductively assigning state terms to each ground expression State(σ ).
The base case is given by (33). This initial state satisfies axiom (32) and the underlying
state constraints, (31). For the induction step, suppose State(σ ) has been assigned a state
term τ which satisfies the state constraints, and consider any well-sorted ground instance α
of the two actions Move(r, u, v,w) and GlueToTable(r, x), respectively. We distinguish the
following cases:
(1) If {State(s) = τ } ∪ {(30),Fstate} |= ¬Poss(α,σ ), then to State(Do(α,σ )) is
assigned τ ;
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(2) else if α = GlueToTable(Robbie, ζ ), then to State(Do(α,σ )) is assigned the state
term τ ◦GluedToTable(ζ ) ◦ Ab(Movable(ζ ),Glued);
(3) else if α =Move(Robbie, ζ, η, ξ), then to State(Do(α,σ )) is assigned
(a) τ ◦On(ζ, ξ) ◦Clear(η)−On(ζ, η) if ξ = Table,
(b) τ ◦On(ζ, ξ) ◦Clear(η)− (On(ζ, η) ◦Clear(ξ)) if ξ = Table.
It is straightforward to verify that this assignment yields a model of the state update
axioms (29) and the state constraints (31). ✷
The formal proof shows how the anomalous model problem is overcome: Since all
defaults are applicable, there is a unique extension, in which reasoning is performed by the
standard techniques of the Fluent Calculus. This crucial feature of our general approach
applies whenever the only abnormalities that occur are justified. Consider, for example,
a slight modification of the anomalous model problem where each of two actions A1
and A2 causes an abnormality with respect to the executability of the other one. If A1 is
performed first, then A2 will no longer be possible, whereas if A2 is performed first, then
A1 will become qualified. In both these scenarios, all defaults apply and define a unique
extension. Again the right conclusion about which action is successful is obtained solely by
the reasoning techniques for actions and effects provided by the standard Fluent Calculus.
4.3.2. Non-deterministic actions and qualifications
Our approach to the Qualification Problem does not interfere with non-deterministic
information. If an abnormal qualification is among the possible (direct or indirect) effects
of a non-deterministic action, then it is not subject to minimization as it has a cause.
Therefore, each extension of the underlying default theory includes the possibility that the
non-deterministic action brings about the abnormality in question. In this way, uncertain
information is treated in the appropriate way, that is, cautiously.
The following elaboration of the blocks world shall illustrate this way of dealing with
non-deterministic actions which possibly give rise to abnormal qualifications. Consider
the action of temporarily exposing glue to the air. Chances are that so doing may have the
effect that the glue becomes unusable. This being a non-deterministic outcome, the action
is formally described by the following disjunctive state update axiom [54]:
Poss
(
ExposeToAir(r,Glue), s
)⊃
Ramify(State(s) ◦ Ab(Usable(Glue),Dried),
Ab(Usable(Glue),Dried),∅,Do(ExposeToAir(r,Glue), s))
∨
Ramify(State(s),∅,∅,Do(ExposeToAir(r,Glue), s)) (34)
Put in words, a possible result of exposing the glue to the air is that it becomes unusable;
the alternative result is that nothing changes at all. A robot can perform the new action
whenever it has glue and its gripper is functioning:
Poss
(
ExposeToAir(r,Glue), s
)≡
Holds
(
Has(r,Glue), s
) ∧ ¬Ab(Functioning(Gripper-of (r)), s) (35)
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Given this knowledge, a careful robot who intends to eventually use his glue had better not
expose it to the air—despite the fact that the glue does not necessarily become unusable by
doing so. In other words, if Robbie knows at some stage that he possesses glue and there
are no hints at abnormal circumstances, then he can reasonably assume by default that he
will be able to glue to the table any block which is clear and stands on the table. Yet it
would be unreasonable if our robot relied on the conclusion that this will still be possible
after having exposed the glue to the air. The following proposition shows that our account
of the Qualification Problem, and in particular the solution to the problem of anomalous
models, is correct in this respect.
Proposition 3. Consider the initial specification,
Holds
(
On(A,Table), S0
)∧Holds(Clear(A),S0)∧
Holds
(
Has(Robbie,Glue), S0
) (36)
Let Σndbw =Σbw∪{(34)∧(35)} and∆ndbw = (Dbw,Σndbw∪{(36)}). Default theory∆ndbw admits
a unique extension E, for which the following holds:
(1) E |= Poss(GlueToTable(Robbie,A),S0),
(2) E |= Poss(ExposeToAir(Robbie,Glue), S0),
(3) E |= Poss(GlueToTable(Robbie,A),Do(ExposeToAir(Robbie,Glue), S0)).
Proof. Suppose there exists an interpretation M for the underlying Fluent Calculus
signature which is a model of Σndbw, of (∀x, s)¬ExogCaused(Ab(x), s) and (∀x, s)¬ExogUncaused(Ab(x), s), and of both
State(S0)=On(A,Table) ◦Clear(A) ◦Has(Robbie,Glue) ◦Clear(Table) (37)
and
State(S1) = On(A,Table) ◦Clear(A) ◦Has(Robbie,Glue) ◦Clear(Table)
◦ Ab(Usable(Glue),Dried) (38)
where S1 =Do(ExposeToAir(Robbie,Glue), S0). Then Σndbw ∪ {(36)} ∪ {ω : :ωω ∈Dbw} is
consistent. Hence, the unique extension E of ∆ndbw is
Th
[
Σndbw ∪ {(36)} ∪
{
ω : : ω
ω
∈Dbw
}]
The second precondition axiom in (30) in conjunction with (37) and Fstate implies that
E |= Poss(GlueToTable(Robbie,A),S0)
Likewise, precondition axiom (35) in conjunction with (37) and Fstate implies that
E |= Poss(ExposeToAir(Robbie,Glue), S0)
Moreover, from Eq. (38) and the second precondition axiom in (30) in conjunction with
Fstate it follows that
M |= ¬Poss(GlueToTable(Robbie,A),S1)
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Hence, sinceM is a model of E,
E |= Poss(GlueToTable(Robbie,A),S1)
It remains to be shown that an interpretation M with the abovementioned properties
does indeed exist. Starting from a model of the given unique-name assumptions, the
foundational axioms, and CIRC[(18)∧ (23)∧ (24)∧ (26);Causes], such a modelM can
be obtained by inductively assigning state terms to each ground expression State(σ ). The
base case is given by (37). This initial state satisfies axiom (36) and the underlying state
constraints, (31). For the induction step, suppose State(σ ) has been assigned a state term τ
which satisfies the state constraints, and consider any well-sorted ground instance α of the
three actions Move(r, u, v,w), GlueToTable(r, x), and ExposeToAir(r,Glue), respectively.
We distinguish the following cases:
(1) If {State(σ ) = τ } ∪ {(30), (35),Fstate} |= ¬Poss(α,σ ), then to State(Do(α,σ )) is
assigned τ ;
(2) else if α = GlueToTable(Robbie,A) then to State(Do(α,σ )) is assigned the state
term τ ◦GluedToTable(A) ◦ Ab(Movable(A),Glued);
(3) else if α = ExposeToAir(Robbie,Glue), then to State(Do(α,σ )) is assigned the state
term τ ◦ Ab(Usable(Glue),Dried).
It is straightforward to verify that this assignment yields a model of the state update
axioms (29) and (34), of the state constraints (31), and of Eq. (38). ✷
5. Explanation and priority
Our discussion thus far was centered around the challenge raised by the problem of
anomalous models in the context of the Qualification Problem. In this section we turn back
to the basic issue of surprising encounters of abnormal qualifications of actions; that is,
abnormal circumstances for which no cause can be found in the foregoing action sequence.
In our approach to the Qualification Problem, once all regular preconditions of an action are
satisfied, the default conclusion is made that the action in question can indeed be executed.
In case the action surprisingly fails, the axiomatization blocks some instance of a default
rule when constructing an extension of the underling default theory. In this way the theory
remains consistent as it still admits one or more extensions. Incidentally, the new set of
extensions entails possible explanations for the encountered failure. Explanation problems
are thus solved deductively, just like prediction and planning problems are.
Suppose, for example, our robot sees block A clear and on the table, and he perceives
block B as clear, too. Suppose further that Robbie, to his own surprise, fails to move A
onto B . Then he deduces that the reason for this abnormal outcome must be that either
block A was not movable or his gripper did not function: Take the initial specification,
Holds
(
On(A,Table), S0
)∧Holds(Clear(A),S0)∧
Holds
(
Clear(B),S0
) (39)
along with the—unexpected—observation,
¬Poss(Move(Robbie,A,Table,B), S0) (40)
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The Fluent Calculus theory Σbw ∪ {(39), (40)} entails
Ab
(
Movable(A),S0
)∨ Ab(Functioning(Gripper-of (Robbie)), S0)
according to the first one of the precondition axioms (30). Hence, (Dbw,Σbw∪{(39), (40)})
admits two kinds of extensions, in one of which all defaults are applied except for some
instance of
δS0
(
Movable(A), y
) (41)
while the other extension is obtained by applying all defaults except for one instance of
δS0
(
Functioning(Gripper-of (Robbie)), y) (42)
The default theory thus entails 22
Ab
(
Movable(A),S0
)⊕ Ab(Functioning(Gripper-of (Robbie)), S0) (43)
A similar result is obtained if an abnormal action qualification is observed in later states:
If the robot first shuffles around a number of blocks without touching A and then turns to
this very block and fails to relocate it, then the default theory entails that an abnormality
either concerning Movable(A) or concerning Functioning(Gripper-of (Robbie)) was
exogenously caused at some point during the foregoing sequence of actions.
Usually, once a surprising qualification is observed, the underlying default theory gives
rise to multiple extensions. Each of them determines a possible explanation for what has
happened, which is exemplified by the particular default that has not been applied. (In
our example above it was either one instance of (41) or one instance of (42) which was
not applied.) Obtaining different extensions means that no preference is given to one or
more explanations although some may be more likely true than others. Hence the only
conclusion supported by all extensions is one possibly big exclusive disjunction of atoms
of the form Holds(Ab(x, y), S0) or ExogCaused(Ab(x,Exog), s). (In our example, we
obtained formula (43) as conclusion.) Considering equal all explanation attempts might be
unsatisfactory insofar as the reasoning agent often needs to know or at least conjecture what
went wrong in order to re-plan the intended future course of actions. Now, by their very
nature, abnormalities are a priori unlikely to happen. Differences among their respective
likelihood seem therefore negligible. The designer of an intelligent agent may nonetheless
wish to incorporate knowledge of the relative likelihood into the axiomatization in order to
help the agent quickly recover from an unexpected failure during the execution of his plan.
For example, the toy blocks in a real-world realization of the blocks world are presumably
crafted in such a way that they all are movable. So if the robot encounters a problem at
some point, then chances are that the problem lies in his gripper rather than in one of the
blocks. Domain knowledge of this kind can be of great help to an autonomous agent in
guiding him through a possible sea of increasingly unlikely explanations.
An elegant way of expressing degrees of abnormality within our theory is given by
the theory of Prioritized Default Logic [7,39]. This extension to the classical framework
supports the specification of (possibly partial) preference orderings among defaults. On
this basis, a reasoner can select those extensions of a default theory which most likely
22 Below, by ψ ⊕ ϕ we denote exclusive disjunction, that is, the formula ψ ∧¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ ∧ ϕ.
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correspond to the actual states of affairs in the world. In what follows, we confine ourselves
to the special case of default theories with only prerequisite-free, normal default rules
(which are characterized by the scheme :ω
ω
); for the general setting see, e.g., [6].
Definition 4 [39]. A prioritized default theory is a triple (D,W,<) where D and W are
as in classical Default Logic and < is a partial ordering on the ground instances of the
elements in D.
If E is a closed set of formulas, then a default :ω
ω
is said to be applied in E iff ω ∈E. Let
∆= (D,W,<) be a prioritized default theory, then an extensionE of the (standard) default
theory (D,W) is a preferred extension of ∆ iff there is a total ordering  extending <
such that the following holds for all extensions E′ of (D,W) and all defaults δ′ ∈D: If δ′
is applied in E′ \E, then there is some δ δ′ which is applied in E \E′.
If δ < δ′, then default δ is said to be preferred over δ′. Thus an extension E is preferred
iff for all extensionsE′, the defaults applied in E ‘compensate’ for each δ′ which is applied
in E′ but not in E. Compensation simply means that there is some default which is applied
in E but not in E′ and which is preferred over δ′ according to the given preference relation.
Or rather, since the preference relation itself may be genuinely partial, according to a total
extension  of <.
Let us see how this development of classical default logic provides means to specify and
reason with domain-dependent knowledge about the relative likelihood of exogenously
caused abnormalities. Recall our set of defaults Dbw and consider this preference order-
ing: 23
δS0
(
Movable(x), y
)
<bw δS0
(
Functioning(Gripper-of (r)), y ′)
δS0
(
Movable(x), y
)
<bw δ
+
Exog
(
Functioning(Gripper-of (r)), s)
δ+Exog
(
Movable(x), s
)
<bw δS0
(
Functioning(Gripper-of (r)), y)
δ+Exog
(
Movable(x), s
)
<bw δ
+
Exog
(
Functioning(Gripper-of (r)), s′)
Put in words, it is even more unlikely, a priori, that a block is immovable than that the
gripper of a robot does not function. In other words, the latter shall always be the preferred
explanation. Notice that nonetheless the ordering is genuinely partial. For there is, for ex-
ample, no preference as to the situation in which an abnormal malfunction of the gripper
arises if several possibilities exist in that respect. The following proposition shows that this
formalization allows a reasoning agent to select preferred explanations.
Proposition 5. Let ∆prbw = (Dbw,Σbw ∪ {(39), (40)},<bw). Then all preferred extensions
∆
pr
bw entail
Ab
(
Functioning(Gripper-of (Robbie)), S0
)
Proof. Axioms (39) and (40) in conjunction with the first one of the precondition axioms
in (30) imply that
Ab
(
Movable(A),S0
)∨ Ab(Functioning(Gripper-of (Robbie)), S0) (44)
23 The following generic relations shall represent all of their ground instances.
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Consequently, the (classical) extensions of (Dbw,Σbw∪{(39), (40)}) are obtained by either
applying all defaults inDbw except for a single instance of δS0(Movable(A), y) or by apply-
ing all defaults inDbw except for a single instance of δS0(Functioning(Gripper-of (Robbie)),
y). Let E(y) denote the extensions of the first kind and E′(y ′) the extensions of the second
kind. From δS0(Movable(A), y)<bwδS0(Functioning(Gripper-of (Robbie)), y ′) for all y, y ′
it follows that none of E(y) is preferred. All extensions E′(y ′) entail ¬Ab(Movable(A),
S0); hence, the claim follows by (44). ✷
6. Strong versus weak qualifications
The action qualifications we have considered so far were strong in the sense that
they render an action physically impossible. A block cannot be moved at all if stuck
to the table. Or, if the robot’s gripper does not function it is impossible even to
start gluing a block to the table. Accordingly, all instances of Ab(Movable(x), s) and
Ab(Functioning(Gripper-of (r)), s) imply the negation of a corresponding instance of the
predicate Poss(a, s).
Actions may also have weak qualifications, which occur when the action can be executed
but does not result in the expected outcome: Either some of the usual effects do not
materialize, or unexpected additional effects are produced, or both. For example, the robot
may succeed with grabbing and lifting a block u which, however, is slippery and hence
soon slips off the gripper and lands on the table before it reaches the intended destination.
If so, the action Move(r, u, v,w) is possible and achieves that On(u, v) becomes false as
expected but fails to produce the other usual effect of On(u,w) becoming true. Instead the
action results in the unexpected On(u,Table).
Though conceptually different from strong qualifications, weak ones can be readily
accommodated in our approach to the Qualification Problem as it stands. Additional
instances of Ab are used to indicate abnormal circumstances regarding weak action
qualifications, like, e.g., Ab(Transportable(x),Slippery) denoting that block x cannot
be transported over a longer distance on account of it being slippery. Minimization by
means of defaults of the form (27) or (28) is applied in the very same fashion as in case
of abnormalities leading to strong qualifications. The crucial formal difference between
strong and weak qualifications is that the fluents representing the former occur in action
precondition axioms while the fluents representing the latter strengthen the antecedents of
state update axioms.
For example, in the light of the possibility that a weak qualification occurs, the current
state update axiom for Move should be refined thus:
Poss
(
Move(r, u, v,w), s
)⊃[¬Ab(Transportable(u), s)⊃
z= State(s) ◦On(u,w)−On(u, v)⊃
Ramify(z,On(u,w),On(u, v),Do(Move(r, u, v,w), s))]∧[
Ab
(
Transportable(u), s
)⊃[
v = Table⊃
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z= State(s) ◦On(u,Table)−On(u, v)⊃
Ramify(z,On(u,Table),On(u, v),Do(Move(r, u, v,w), s))]∧[
v = Table⊃ Ramify(State(s),∅,∅,Do(Move(r, u, v,w), s))]] (45)
Let Σwqbw be as Σbw but with the first one of the state update axioms in (29) replaced by
axiom (45). Then the robot should conclude that moving a block has all of the usual effects
if nothing hints at an abnormal weak qualification. On the other hand, if a Move action was
possible but the robot, upon checking the new situation, sees that the block it carried is not
at the destination, then it should conclude that a weak qualification occurred and that the
block can be found somewhere on the table. The following proposition states that these
conclusions are indeed formally supported by our axiomatization.
Proposition 6. Consider the initial specification,
Holds
(
On(A,B),S0
)∧Holds(Clear(A),S0)∧Holds(Clear(C),S0) (46)
and let S1 =Do(Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0).
(1) (Dbw,Σwqbw ∪ {(46)}) admits a unique extension, which entails
Poss
(
Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0
)∧Holds(On(A,C),S1)
(2) (Dbw,Σwqbw ∪ {(46),Poss(Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0) ∧ ¬Holds(On(A,C),S1)})
admits a unique extension, which entails
Ab
(
Transportable(A),S0
)∧Holds(On(A,Table), S1)
Proof. (1) Let ∆wqbw = (Dbw,Σwqbw ∪ {(46)}). Suppose there exists an interpretation M
which is model of Σwqbw , of
(∀x, s)¬ExogCaused(Ab(x), s) and (∀x, s)¬ExogUncaused(Ab(x), s),
and of
State(S0) = On(A,B) ◦Clear(A) ◦Clear(C) (47)◦ On(B,Table) ◦On(C,Table) ◦Clear(Table)
Then Σwqbw ∪ {(46)} ∪ {ω : :ωω ∈Dbw} is consistent. Hence, the unique extension E of ∆wqbw
is
Th
[
Σ
wq
bw ∪ {(46)} ∪
{
ω : : ω
ω
∈Dbw
}]
Precondition axioms (30) in conjunction with (47) and Fstate imply that
E |= Poss(Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0)
Moreover, since E |= ¬Ab(Transportable(A),S0), the first part of state update axiom (45)
applies to action Move(Robbie,A,B,C) and situation S0 and entails, in conjunction with
CIRC[(18)∧ (23)∧ (24)∧ (26);Causes], that E |= Holds(On(A,C),S1). The existence
of an interpretationM with the abovementioned properties can be proved along the line of
the proof for Proposition 2.
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(2) Let ∆wqbw = (Dbw,Σwqbw ∪ {(46),Poss(Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0) ∧ ¬Holds(On(A,
C),S1)}). From (46) and Poss(Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0)∧¬Holds(On(A,C),S1) along
with the contraposition of the first part of state update axiom (45) in conjunction with
CIRC[(18)∧ (23)∧ (24)∧ (26);Causes], it follows that Ab(Transportable(A),S0). Hence,
the second part of state update axiom (45) applies to action Move(Robbie,A,B,C)
and situation S0. In conjunction with the other domain axioms in Σwqbw it follows that
Holds(On(A,Table), S1). All of these conclusions hold without the need to apply any
default rule, hence are contained in all extensions of ∆wqbw. The existence of a unique
extension is proved in analogy to the proof above. ✷
7. Accidents
Abnormal qualifications in our sense are persistent by default: Once an abnormality
has been observed, the agent cannot assume that it will sort itself out. Accordingly, Ab
is a fluent, which keeps its value unless it is caused to change (possibly for exogenous
reasons). In this section, we extend our theory to also cover the opposite of persistent
qualifications, that is, failures which do not normally recur. We call accidents this kind
of abnormalities. An example may be that a block just accidentally drops off the gripper
without being slippery in general. It may then be more reasonable, on encountering an
anomaly, to first of all assume an accident and to do the action again instead of searching
for a more fundamental (that is, persistent) reason.
Our concept of accidents as a non-recurring phenomenon includes the assumption
that the occurrence of an accident cannot be caused by preceding actions. The problem
of anomalous models, which concerned caused abnormalities, does therefore not apply
to the minimization of accidents. Formally, we extend further the standard Fluent
Calculus signature by the generic atom Accident(a, s) to denote that an accident with
action a in situation s happens. Accidents are then assumed away by the generic default
rule,
δAcc(a, s)= α : ¬Accident(a, s)¬Accident(a, s) (48)
On this basis, actions which can go wrong accidentally are specified by state update
axioms which include a specification of the effect in case of an accident. For example,
the action of moving a block (cf. (45)) shall be specified as follows in view of a potential
accident: 24
Poss
(
Move(r, u, v,w), s
)⊃[¬Accident(Move(r, u, v,w), s) ∧¬Ab(Transportable(u), s)⊃
z= State(s) ◦On(u,w)−On(u, v)⊃
Ramify(z,On(u,w),On(u, v),Do(Move(r, u, v,w), s))]∧
24 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that an accident with the action Move has the deterministic effect that
the block ends up somewhere on the table. A non-deterministic state update axiom could be used to specify that
the block may also accidentally land on top of any clear block.
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[
Accident
(
Move(r, u, v,w), s
)∨ Ab(Transportable(u), s)⊃[
v = Table⊃ z= State(s) ◦On(u,Table)−On(u, v)⊃
Ramify(z,On(u,Table),On(u, v),Do(Move(r, u, v,w), s))] ∧[
v = Table⊃ Ramify(State(s),∅,∅,Do(Move(r, u, v,w), s))]] (49)
The possibility to explain unexpected effects as accidents can help a planning agent
quickly recover from an observed action failure. If an accident is the best explanation,
then the agent can predict that he will succeed with simply retrying the crucial action. To
this end, it should be possible to specify, e.g., that a single accident is more likely than
some exogenously caused persistent qualification while two such accidents in a row are
less likely. For example, if our robot observes that he has dropped a block while moving
it, he should first assume an accident and just try to move the block again. If, however, he
fails a second time, then the most reasonable explanation shall be to consider the block not
transportable.
Domain knowledge of the relative likelihood of abnormalities and accidents that takes
this form goes beyond the expressiveness of Prioritized Default Logic used in Section 5.
There, preferences among defaults are defined in isolation. Consequently, if a default has
higher priority than another one, this preference holds regardless of which other defaults
apply. We therefore generalize Prioritized Default Logic to allow for context-dependent
preferences among defaults as follows:
Definition 7. A set-prioritized default theory is a triple ∆= (D,W,≺) where D and W
are as in classical Default Logic and ≺ is a partial ordering on the power-set of the ground
instances of the elements in D.
An extension E of the (standard) default theory (D,W) is a preferred extension of ∆ iff
there is no extension E′ such that appD(E′ \E)≺ appD(E \E′) where appD(E) denotes
the defaults from D that are applied in E.
Put in words, in a set-prioritized default theory a preference relation is specified on sets
of defaults. An extension E is preferred just in case there is no extension E′ such that the
defaults applied in E′ \E are given priority over the defaults applied in E \E′.
As an example, consider the following set-preference ordering: 25{
δS0
(
Transportable(u), y
)} ≺bw {δAcc(Move(r, u, v,w), s)}{
δ+Exog
(
Transportable(u), s
)} ≺bw {δAcc(Move(r, u, v,w), s′)}{
δAcc
(
Move(ri, u, vi ,wi), si
)}
2 ≺bw
{
δS0
(
Transportable(u), y
)}
{
δAcc
(
Move(ri, u, vi ,wi), si
)}
2 ≺bw
{
δ+Exog
(
Transportable(u), s
)}
where {δAcc(Move(ri , u, vi ,wi), si )}2 stands for any set of instances of δAcc(Move(ri , u,
vi,wi), si) with two or more elements. Hence, assuming away an initial or exogenously
caused abnormality with respect to block u being transportable is preferred over assuming
away a single accident when moving u. The preference is reversed in case the observations
cannot be explained by a single accident with the same block.
25 As above, the following generic relations shall represent all of their ground instances.
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Let Σaccbw be as Σ
wq
bw but with state update axiom (45) replaced by (49), and let Daccbw be
Dbw augmented by (48), with prerequisite α = True. The following proposition shows that
this domain axiomatization exhibits the intended behavior: After failing to move a block it
can be predicted that a retry will be successful, but if the failure repeats, then the block is
inferred to not being transportable.
Proposition 8. Consider the initial specification,
Holds
(
On(A,B),S0
)∧Holds(Clear(A),S0)∧Holds(Clear(C),S0) (50)
and let S1 =Do(Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0), S2 =Do(Move(Robbie,A,Table,C), S1).
(1) Consider the observation,
Poss
(
Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0
)∧Holds(On(A,Table), S1) (51)
Then ∆1 = (Daccbw ,Σaccbw ∪ {(50), (51)},≺bw) admits a unique preferred extension,
which entails
Poss
(
Move(Robbie,A,Table,C), S1
)∧Holds(On(A,C),S2)
(2) Consider the additional observation,
Poss
(
Move(Robbie,A,Table,C), S1
)∧Holds(On(A,Table), S2) (52)
Let ∆2 = (Daccbw ,Σaccbw ∪{(50), (51), (52)},≺bw), then all preferred extensions of ∆2
entail
Ab
(
Transportable(A),S0
)
Proof. (1) Observation (51) and state update axiom (49) in conjunction with the
circumscribed causal relationships in Σbw imply that
Accident
(
Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0
)∨ Ab(Transportable(A),S0)
Consequently, the (classical) extensions of ∆1 are obtained by applying all elements of
Daccbw except for either a single instance of δS0(Transportable(A), y) or the single default
δAcc(Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0). Let E(y) denote the extensions of the first kind, then
appDaccbw
(
E(y)
)=Dbw \ {δS0(Transportable(A), y)}
Likewise, let E′ denote the extension of the second kind, then
appDaccbw (E
′)=Dbw \
{
δAcc
(
Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0
)}
From {δS0(Transportable(A), y)}≺bw {δAcc(Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0)} for all y it fol-
lows that E′ is preferred but none of E(y). Moreover, E′ entails
¬Ab(x, s) ∧ [ s = S0 ⊃¬Accident(a, s)]
The claim follows from the precondition axioms in (30) and state update axiom (49).
(2) Observations (51) and (52) and state update axiom (49) in conjunction with the
circumscribed causal relationships in Σbw imply that
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[
Accident
(
Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0
)∨ Ab(Transportable(A),S0)] ∧[
Accident
(
Move(Robbie,A,Table,C), S1
)∨ Ab(Transportable(A),S1)]
Consequently, the (classical) extensions of ∆2 are E(y) (for some y), E′, and E′′, defined
by
appDaccbw
(
E(y)
)=Dbw \ {δS0(Transportable(A), y)}
appDaccbw (E
′)=Dbw \
{
δAcc
(
Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0
)
,
δ+Exog
(
Transportable(A),S1
)}
appDaccbw (E
′′)=Dbw \
{
δAcc
(
Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0
)
,
δAcc
(
Move(Robbie,A,Table,C), S1
)}
Since {δAcc(Move(Robbie,A,B,C),S0), δAcc(Move(Robbie,A,Table,C), S1)} is given
priority over {δS0(Transportable(A), y)} for all y , extension E′′ is not preferred. Also,
since {δ+Exog(Transportable(A),S1)}≺bw {δAcc(Move(Robbie,A,Table,C), S1)}, extension
E′ is not preferred. The claim follows because all of the remaining extensions, E(y), entail
Ab(Transportable(A),S0). ✷
8. Discussion
The problem of anomalous models has been the crucial barrier towards extensive
approaches to the Qualification Problem, which in turn constitutes an important theoretical
challenge towards the design of artificial intelligent agents for real-world environments. We
have proposed a formal account of the Qualification Problem which solves the problem
of anomalous models based on an established predicate logic formalism for reasoning
about actions. The theory provides the formal foundations for specifying real-world agents
capable of making useful predictions as well as explaining and recovering from unexpected
action failures. It has been shown how the basic solution can be extended so as to deal with
qualitative knowledge of the relative likelihood of the various explanations for abnormal
qualifications. Furthermore, it has been illustrated how weak qualifications and accidents
can be expressed, that is, unexpected effects and non-recurring action failures, respectively.
We have built our theory on the Fluent Calculus as a solution to the Frame and Ramification
Problem. As a result we now have a uniform formalism which successfully copes with all
three classical problems in reasoning about actions. Moreover, extensions of the Fluent
Calculus deal with concurrent actions and continuous change [53,56] or with sensing
actions [55]. Staying within classical logic, these techniques are compatible with our
default rules for modeling abnormal qualifications.
Based on our approach to the Qualification Problem, the logic program developed in [23]
copes with the Qualification Problem in the action programming language FLUX (the
Fluent Calculus Executor) [52]. The system allows to plan under the default assumption
that actions succeed as they normally do, and to reason about these assumptions in order to
recover from unexpected action failures. The system has been successfully applied to the
high-level control of robots.
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The focus in this paper has been on the Fluent Calculus as a particular predicate logic
formalism. The underlying principles of our theory, however, are sufficiently general to
not depend on this choice. The solution to the problem of anomalous models outlined in
Section 2.4 rather promises feasible in any other formalism which is sufficiently expressive
in that it includes solutions to both the Frame and the Ramification Problem.
Assuming away by default abnormal qualifications of actions is an inherently non-
monotonic process. In [20], a property called restricted monotonicity has been claimed
generally desirable in theories of actions. A formalism possesses this property if adding
observations to a domain description increases the set of entailed observations. However,
when being confronted with the Qualification Problem, restricted monotonicity is not desir-
able, since an unexpected observation should cause the planning agent to withdraw certain
normality assumptions. Consequently, our theory does not satisfy this property, thanks to
the use of Default Logic.
An alternative to our solution of the problem of anomalous models might be provided
by the concept of chronological ignorance [45,46]. Roughly speaking, the crucial idea
is to assume away, by default, abnormal circumstances, and simultaneously to prefer
minimization of abnormalities at earlier timepoints. 26 Our approach to the Qualification
Problem and minimizing chronologically share the notion of directedness: By minimizing
chronologically, one tends to minimize causes rather than effects—which is the right thing
to do—simply because in general causes precede effects. It has been shown elsewhere
(e.g., [16,40,47]) that the applicability of chronological minimization is intrinsically
restricted to reasoning problems which do not involve indeterminate information, that
is, non-deterministic actions or incomplete state knowledge. The refined method of
prioritized chronological minimization [3,57] aims at overcoming these restrictions.
Roughly speaking again, the crucial idea is to chronologically minimize with an
additional preference ordering on atoms: First, event occurrences are minimized, then
event abnormalities, and finally affectations of fluents. In particular, by minimizing
potential affectations instead of actual changes the problem of non-deterministic actions
is overcome [41]. There are three main conceptual differences between our framework and
the theory of [3], which is built on the idea of prioritized chronological minimization. First,
a nonmonotonic and temporal variant of Kleene’s three-valued logic is used together with a
special semantics tailored to chronological minimization. In contrast, our approach builds
on the general framework of Default Logic and its standard semantics. Second, the tasks
of prediction and explanation require different reasoning mechanisms, namely, deduction
vs. abduction, while predicting, planning, and explaining are uniformly dealt with in our
theory. Finally, we were interested in building our approach to the Qualification Problem
on an existing solution to the technical Frame Problem.
Our account of the Qualification Problem shares with Motivated Action Theory (MAT)
[1,47] the insight that an appropriate notion of causality is necessary when assuming
away abnormalities. In this framework, occurrences of actions and events are assumed
away by default while taking into consideration the possibility that they are caused (or,
in other words, motivated, hence the name). This minimizing unmotivated events and
26 This explains the naming: Potential abnormal qualifications are ignored whenever possible, and this is done
in chronological order.
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our minimizing non-caused abnormal qualifications are somehow complementary while
based on similar principles. Problems with MAT have been pointed out in [30] concerning
the applicability to both the explanation problem and the Ramification Problem, due to
the fact that effects of unmotivated events are defined as unmotivated, too. This aspect
has been improved in Explanatory Update Theory, which combines MAT with a theory
of information change to minimize information loss between states [30]. Aside from
addressing other problems, a fundamental difference to our framework is that the Frame
Problem is solved on the semantic level via a special-purpose Kripke-style semantics.
Finally, it should be mentioned that we gave emphasis only to the representational aspect
of the Qualification Problem. It has been pointed out, e.g., in [9], that there is also an
important computational aspect to this problem. Our analysis in this paper was driven
by the problem of anomalous models, which is a purely representational issue, and—to
state the obvious—the computational aspect cannot be pursued without an appropriate
representation of the problem. The challenge of the computational Qualification Problem
is to find a computational model that enables the agent to reason without even considering
all possible qualifying causes for his actions—unless some piece of knowledge hints at
their presence. A way to tune our representation towards the computational aspect is to
introduce predicates of the form Norm(A(x), s), meaning that no abnormal qualification of
the respective action A(x) holds in situation s, along with a suitable definition like
Norm
(
Move(r, u, v,w), s
)≡
¬Ab(Movable(u), s)∧¬Ab(Functioning(Gripper-of (r)), s) (53)
With this addition, action precondition axioms need only mention the atomic condition of
normality in addition to the regular preconditions, as in
Poss
(
Move(r, u, v,w), s
) ≡
u =w ∧ v =w ∧Holds(Clear(u), s)∧Holds(On(u, v), s)∧
Holds
(
Clear(w), s
)∧ Norm(Move(r, u, v,w), s)
The generic default rule,
: Norm(a, s)
Norm(a, s)
then allows to jump to the conclusion that a be executable provided all regular
preconditions are met. Still, on the other hand, in order that this assumption be justified,
its consistency as regards the corresponding definition, like (53), must be guaranteed. In a
standard automated deduction system, this in turn involves consideration (and exclusion) of
all the potential qualifying abnormal circumstances. A solution to the computational aspect
of the Qualification Problem thus requires a different computational model, presumably
based on some parallel architecture, by which all related state constraints are ignored unless
they are explicitly ‘activated’ by some piece of information. Although this was not an issue
in this paper, the foundations have been laid.
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